A review of significant events analysed in general practice: implications for the quality and safety of patient care by McKay, John et al.
BioMed  Central
Open Access
Page 1 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Family Practice
Research article
A review of significant events analysed in general practice: 
implications for the quality and safety of patient care
John McKay*1, Nick Bradley2, Murray Lough2 and Paul Bowie2
Address: 1Division of Community Based Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK and 2NHS Education for Scotland, Glasgow, UK
Email: John McKay* - john.mckay@nes.scot.nhs.uk; Nick Bradley - nick.bradley@nes.scot.nhs.uk; 
Murray Lough - murray.lough@nes.scot.nhs.uk; Paul Bowie - paul.bowie@nes.scot.nhs.uk
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
Background: Significant event analysis (SEA) is promoted as a team-based approach to enhancing
patient safety through reflective learning. Evidence of SEA participation is required for appraisal and
contractual purposes in UK general practice. A voluntary educational model in the west of Scotland
enables general practitioners (GPs) and doctors-in-training to submit SEA reports for feedback
from trained peers. We reviewed reports to identify the range of safety issues analysed, learning
needs raised and actions taken by GP teams.
Method: Content analysis of SEA reports submitted in an 18 month period between 2005 and
2007.
Results: 191 SEA reports were reviewed. 48 described patient harm (25.1%). A further 109
reports (57.1%) outlined circumstances that had the potential to cause patient harm. Individual
'error' was cited as the most common reason for event occurrence (32.5%). Learning opportunities
were identified in 182 reports (95.3%) but were often non-specific professional issues not shared
with the wider practice team. 154 SEA reports (80.1%) described actions taken to improve practice
systems or professional behaviour. However, non-medical staff were less likely to be involved in
the changes resulting from event analyses describing patient harm (p < 0.05)
Conclusion: The study provides some evidence of the potential of SEA to improve healthcare
quality and safety. If applied rigorously, GP teams and doctors in training can use the technique to
investigate and learn from a wide variety of quality issues including those resulting in patient harm.
This leads to reported change but it is unclear if such improvement is sustained.
Background
Patient safety dominates the agenda in most modern
health care systems including the National Health Service
(NHS) in the United Kingdom (UK) [1,2]. However, evi-
dence of the main threats to patient safety and their
potential solutions is limited. Although incidences of
error and rates of patient harm have been quantified to
some extent in secondary care [3-7] similar estimates in
primary care [8-18] have been criticised as lacking in con-
sistency and theoretical construct [19].
Despite many safety concerns being generic across health-
care sectors, primary care is recognised as involving spe-
cific challenges. It is characterised by self-limiting
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conditions where safety-critical incidents occur relatively
infrequently and clinical management decision-making
often includes a level of uncertainty as a result of often
undifferentiated symptoms across a broad range of health
and illness issues [20,21]. The differing physical, psycho-
logical, social and personal choices unique to each patient
mean that there is often justifiable variation in practice
[22,23]. Similarly, the unique business position of UK
general practices (independent contractor status) com-
pared with the acute sector (largely directly managed NHS
organisations) is an unknown quantity in terms of influ-
ence and impact on patient safety concerns. Quality
improvement methods when applied in the general prac-
tice context may need to allow for these variations, com-
plexities and associated organisational and cultural
factors.
One potential improvement method that is largely,
although not exclusively, confined to UK primary care is
significant event analysis (SEA) [24] which is promoted as
a team-based approach to enhancing safety, managing
risk and facilitating the reporting of safety incidents [25-
27]. Expectations for SEA are high. Individual general
practitioners (GPs) and their health care teams must pro-
vide documentary evidence of SEA participation as part of
professional, contractual and clinical governance obliga-
tions [28,29]. The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA)
also recommends that primary care teams should identify
and analyse those significant events which have resulted
in "minor" or "moderate" harm to patients, or had the
potential to do so [27].
However, two interrelated issues arguably hinder the
progress of the safety agenda in general practice. Firstly,
there is a lack of evidence for the effectiveness of SEA in
terms of its value in facilitating learning and change which
leads to credible improvements in health care quality
[25]. Secondly, fully engaging the primary care team in the
reporting of patient safety incidents as part of formal
reporting and learning mechanisms has proved to be
extremely challenging [30].
Gaining some insight into how SEA may contribute to our
understanding of important quality and safety issues is
clearly desirable to help close the evidential gap. In the
west of Scotland region, a voluntary educational system
offers GPs the opportunity to submit SEA reports for peer
feedback from trained colleagues as part of continuing
professional developments [31]. A substantial bank of
reports has been submitted and retained in the past dec-
ade, which offers important potential for research and
learning.
Against this background, the aim of this study was to
review the contents of SEA reports submitted by GPs and
in doing so to identify the range of quality and safety
issues analysed, the types of learning needs raised and the
purported actions implemented by health care teams. The
findings could then be used to inform on aspects of the
debate on the effectiveness of SEA [25].
Methods
Study design, sample, timescale and ethical approval
The study involved a content analysis of SEA reports vol-
untarily submitted by GPs between July 2005 and Febru-
ary 2007 for external peer feedback as part of an
educational model developed and managed by NHS Edu-
cation for Scotland (NES) - a special health authority with
responsibility for the training and education of the health-
care workforce [31]. In this model a significant event is
defined as "...any event thought by any member of the practice
team to be significant in the care of patients or the conduct of
the practice" [24]. This broad definition was to allow for
any issue that impacts either directly or indirectly on the
quality of patient care to be addressed.
The study was approved by NHS Greater Glasgow Primary
Care Division Research Ethics Committee (REC Ref No.
04/S0701/71).
Peer review of SEA reports
All reports were submitted by two GP groups: GP princi-
pals (qualified family doctors) as part of their continuing
professional development and GP registrars (family doc-
tors in training) as part of a regional training requirement.
SEA were submitted in a standard report format (Table 1)
and sent to two trained GPs for independent review using
a validated feedback instrument [32]. Good practice in
SEA recommends that it involves all necessary members
of the healthcare team and is conducted in a fair and non-
threatening environment. As such, the author of the
report is encouraged to describe the consensus view of the
team's analysis where appropriate.
As part of an overall global judgement on the quality of
the analysis report, reviewers were asked to make a deter-
mination using the feedback instrument as to whether the
SEA report was satisfactory or unsatisfactory. Where there
was disagreement between the two reviewers a third
reviewer - the peer review co-ordinator - would make a
final decision. Those considered 'unsatisfactory' were
excluded from the study because they were highly likely to
be deficient analyses. We know from previous research
involving these 'unsatisfactory' reports that insights into
why the event happened may be lacking, learning needs
may not have been identified or appropriate action was
not taken to reduce the risk of recurrence [33]. All GPs
consented to their anonymised reports being used in this
study.BMC Family Practice 2009, 10:61 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/10/61
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Content analysis of SEA reports
Coding of events, reasons for occurrence, learning needs and actions 
taken
Each SEA report was analysed for content independently
by two researchers (NB & JM). The authors developed a
preliminary coding framework by merging and adapting
the main categories and subcategories of errors, [12,15]
adverse events [10] and potentially harmful events [9]
previously reported in published research from primary
care. The codings were further developed and refined as
the study progressed. The authors were unaware of similar
frameworks for classifying learning needs and actions
taken. These were developed on an iterative basis as each
SEA report was reviewed. Reports often described multiple
events, reasons for occurrence, learning needs and actions
taken. A pragmatic decision was taken not to assign a sin-
gle code for each of these factors because of the inherent
difficulty in reaching agreement because events could be
highly complex, information could be missing and
improvements were often multi-factorial.
Data validation
Joint meetings between the researchers took place after a
set of five SEA reports had been reviewed. Where there was
disagreement between researchers a consensus was
reached on the codes assigned. To enhance validity, a
third researcher (PB) independently analysed one-in-five
reports and the associated coding before meeting with the
other two researchers to triangulate final agreement on
the data collected.
Data collection and analysis
The following data were collected using a pre-designed
proforma: type of significant event; reasons cited for event
occurrence; involvement of external agencies/individuals;
level of patient harm (NPSA grading system: death, severe,
moderate, low and none); type of learning issues identi-
fied; and type of actions taken. Data were entered into a
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Descriptive statistics and dif-
ferences in proportions between GP group data were cal-
culated along with 95% confidence intervals using
Minitab version 13.
Results
SEA reports reviewed
286 SEA reports were submitted during the study times-
cale. Of these 95 (33%) were excluded because they were
judged 'unsatisfactory' by peer review. A total of 191 SEA
reports were therefore subject to review of which a 99 were
submitted by 74 GP principals (51.8%) {Range one to
four reports per GP principal} and 92 by 90 GP registrars
(48.1%) {Range one to two reports per GP registrar}.
Types of significant event
A classification summary of the most frequently occurring
significant event codes with examples is outlined in Table
2. Events involving disease diagnoses and/or disease man-
agement (46, 24.1%) along with prescribing issues (46,
24.1%) were the most common subjects for analysis. 'Dis-
ease diagnosis' categorisation involved issues such as the
delay in the identification of a specific cancer while 'dis-
ease management' referred to events such as the care of a
terminally ill patient. Prescribing issues included prescrib-
ing an inappropriate dosage of medication. Almost as
prevalent were issues precipitated by the patient or their
relative (43, 22.5%) such as unnecessary medication
requests and anger or upset at an aspect of their health-
care.
Table 1: Summary of standard SEA framework and report format recommended in NHS Scotland
1. What Happened?
• Collate and record as much factual information as possible about the event including, for example, what happened, when and where, what was 
the outcome and who was involved.
￿ Record the thoughts and opinions of those involved, including patients and relatives if appropriate, and attempt to form an accurate impression 
of what happened
2. Why did it happen?
￿ Ensure the main reasons why the event occurred are fully established and recorded, e.g. was it a failure in a system or a failure to adhere to 
protocol?
￿ Establish the underlying or contributory reasons as to why the event occurred, e.g. why was there a failure in a system or adherence to a 
protocol.
3. What has been learned?
￿ Agree and record the main learning issues for the health care team or individual team members.
￿ Ensure that insight into the event has been established by the team or the individuals concerned
4. What has been changed?
￿ Agree and implement appropriate action in order to minimize the chance of recurrence, where change is considered to be relevant.
￿ Monitor the implementation of any change introducedBMC Family Practice 2009, 10:61 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/10/61
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Reasons for occurrence
A classification summary with examples of the most fre-
quently cited reasons by GPs as to why events occurred is
outlined in Table 3. The most prevalent cause of events
identified was that of individual health care professionals
'errors' relating to their knowledge and skills (62, 32.5%).
Substandard communication issues between the practice
and the patient or within and between care providers was
the second most frequent cause of significant events
occurring (58, 30.4%). Patient behaviour such as non
adherence to medication or refusal to attend for investiga-
tions was also a significant contributory factor in over a
quarter of reports (55, 28.9%).
External involvement in significant events
104 SEA reports (54.5%) described the direct or indirect
involvement of other health and social care agencies in
the significant event as follows: secondary care (58,
30.4%); community pharmacy (13, 6.8%); out-of-hours
services (7, 3.7%) and social services (3, 1.6%); other [e.g.
police or ambulance service] (32, 16.8%).
Learning issues identified
182 reports (95.3%) identified learning needs, points or
issues which required to be addressed as part of event
analyses (Table 4). Over half of reports identified personal
learning issues for the individual doctor who drafted the
SEA report. These learning issues related mainly to
'generic' issues around diagnosis, clinical management
and patient behaviour. Specific learning points relating to
clinical knowledge in areas such as psychiatry or contra-
ception were detailed in less than a sixth of reports.
Actions agreed and implemented
154 reports (80.1%) demonstrated that change(s) had
been agreed and implemented by at least one member of
the primary care team as a result of the SEA (Table 5). 32
reports (16.6%) detailed a change(s) in which other GPs,
nurses and health visitors in the GP practice (as well as the
author of the report) were able to apply new or revised
clinical knowledge and skills. In just under one sixth of
reports this application of new knowledge, skills and
changes in clinical behaviour was adopted by the report-
ing GP only.
The methodology chosen to implement change was most
often the development of new or adaption of existing pro-
tocols. This was detailed in 73 reports (44.5%)
Levels of patient harm
48 SEA reports (25.1%) described incidents which led to
patient harm (Table 6). A further 109 reports (57.1%)
outlined circumstances which had the potential to cause
patient harm but were either prevented or ran to comple-
tion without harm occurring ('near misses'). A minority of
reports (34, 17.8%) did not involve incidents which could
have compromised patient safety.
Table 2: Type and number of significant events identified (191 SEA reports)
Significant Event Types n%
Disease diagnosis and disease management
(e.g. missed or delayed diagnosis of cancer, terminal care pain management)
46 24.1
Prescribing, dispensing and other drug issues
(e.g. wrong/inappropriate drug prescribed/administered, warfarin issue)
46 24.1
Patient and relatives
(e.g. patient behaviour, anger or upset)
43 22.5
Investigations and results
(e.g. incorrect results given to patient, results not acted upon)
37 19.4
Communication
(e.g. lack of communication, unsuccessful communication)
23 12.0
Administration
(e.g. complaint, breach of protocol)
16 8.4
Medical records and confidentiality
(e.g. breach of confidentiality, wrong records accessed)
15 7.9
Appointments and surgeries
(e.g. patient did not arrive issues, running late)
12 6.3
Home visits and external care
(e.g. delay in arrival, visit request not done)
10 5.2
Equipment
(e.g. computer search facility ineffective, difficulty accessing cupboard containing medical supplies)
73 . 7
Miscellaneous
(e.g. difficulty in signing death certificate, change in partnership personnel)
21 . 1
Health and safety
(e.g. staff injury, unsuccessful procedure for dealing with clinical waste)
21 . 1
* More than one classification may have been accorded to a single SEA report.BMC Family Practice 2009, 10:61 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/10/61
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Of the 48 reports of patient harm, 42 (87.5%) described
the direct or indirect involvement of health care teams or
agencies external to the general practice as well as mem-
bers of the practice team. In comparison, of the 109
reports that had the potential to result in patient harm but
did not, a total of 62 involved health care teams or agen-
cies (56.9%) external to the practice [difference 30.6%;
95% CI 17.4 to 43.8; P < 0.001].
The involvement of staff in the SEAs where learning issues
were identified and where change was implemented are
shown in Table 7. Practice managers, nurses and adminis-
tration staff were significantly less likely to be involved in
both the learning and the implementation of change from
the analysis of a significant event which resulted in patient
harm compared with events which did not cause harm.
Discussion
Main findings
The types of significant events described in this study are
consistent with the broad range of clinical and adminis-
trative events previously identified in similar general prac-
tice studies [24,34]. The majority of events had the
potential to cause patient harm, while one quarter
described incidences of patient harm. Several of the major
underlying reasons why significant events occurred, such
as knowledge and skills errors or communication difficul-
ties are consistent with previously reported reasons why
errors and adverse events occur in both UK and interna-
tional family practice [7,8,11,12]. Although learning
issues are identified in the majority of SEA reports these
frequently relate to non-specific personal learning issues
which do not appear to be shared with the practice team.
There also appears to be limited direct involvement of the
practice team members in implementing the changes
required from the SEA. If, however, a significant event has
resulted in patient harm then medical colleagues tend to
be involved in the implementation of change in the great
majority of cases.
Study limitations and strengths
The reports voluntarily submitted to the SEA peer feed-
back model described may not be representative of those
undertaken by the GP population as they are likely to be
highly selective [31]. The reports reviewed were judged by
trained peers to be 'satisfactory' event analyses, while a
substantial minority was considered 'unsatisfactory'. This
provides an element of verification and assurance of SEA
Table 3: Reasons for occurrence of significant events and the number of reports identifying these occurrences (191 SEA reports)
Reasons Given n%
Individual health care professional 'errors'
(e.g. lack of knowledge of practice/hospital protocols, poor clinical task delivery)
62 32.5
Communication
(e.g. substandard communication between practice and patient, substandard communication between practice and hospital/out of hours/other 
agencies)
58 30.4
Patient and relatives
(e.g. negative patient behaviour, illness behaviour)
55 28.9
Disease/diagnosis/management
(e.g. difficult diagnosis, incomplete history/examination)
44 23.0
Administration
(e.g. poor task delivery, ineffective administrative system/protocol)
32 16.8
Medication
(e.g. error writing/prescribing/administering (wrong drug dosage/formulation prescribed), no system/protocol to check for out of date emergency 
tray/bag medicines)
23 12.0
Tests/investigations/results
(e.g. no sample tracking/record, delay in checking blood tests results)
22 11.5
Patient records
(e.g. failure to check notes adequately, failure to record in notes)
18 9.4
Equipment
(e.g. ineffective emergency buzzer system for staff to identify location of emergency, inadequate search facility on computer system)
13 6.8
General practice protocols/systems/guidelines
(e.g. no formal protocol for checking BHCGs, no system for emergency bag tracking)
84 . 2
Clinical behaviour (e.g. doctor avoidance of addressing a difficult situation, lack of clinical leadership of patient review) 84 . 2
Reasons for event undetermined 73 . 7
Appointments
(e.g. delay in being seen, not enough time with patients)
63 . 1
Visits/external care
(e.g. change in out of hrs service, delay in attending house visit)
31 . 6
￿ More than one classification may have been accorded to a single SEA report.BMC Family Practice 2009, 10:61 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/10/61
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Table 4: Type, range and number of learning issues identified from 191 SEA reports submitted
Learning Issues identified n%
Personal Awareness/Responsibilities and Change
(e.g. general issues on improving diagnosis and management, dealing with negative patient/family behaviour)
98 51.3
Communication (e.g. issues on communication with patient, issues on communication within team)5 4 28.3
Administration
(e.g. need for new/improved protocols/systems, staff training required)
36 18.9
Clinical Knowledge
(e.g. psychiatry, contraception)
30 15.7
Equipment/task aids/workspace
(e.g. become familiar with medical centre - whereabouts of drugs and equipment, the need to secure and check prescription pads)
26 13.6
Case Notes (e.g. the need for accurate detailed documentation, Read clinical notes)1 7 8.9
Whole Practice Awareness
(e.g. need for system to respond to emergency within practice, clarification of responsibilities)
16 8.4
Medication/Prescription
(e.g. responsibilities for GP-secondary care interface prescribing, need for better supervision of PRHO prescribing)
9 4.7
Patient/Carers
(e.g. effects of mental illness on carers, education required on self-management of asthma)
6 3.1
Complaints
(e.g. dealing with complaints system, avoiding complaints being generated)
4 2.1
GP and Partners Awareness
(e.g. the need for regular medication review with GPs, the importance of efficient and accurate results handling system)
4 2.1
Health and Safety
(e.g. re-sheathing needles should not be undertaken, to ensure all clinical staff immunised against Hepatitis B)
3 1.6
￿ 182 reports detailed at least one learning issue
￿ More than one learning point may have been reported in a single report.
Table 5: Type and range of actions taken from 191 SEA reports
Changes implemented n%
Clinical Team Disease Diagnosis and Management
(e.g. raised clinical awareness/knowledge by dissemination to others then actioned, raised procedural awareness and dissemination to 
others for action)
32 16.6
Doctors Personal Skills/Behaviour/Knowledge application
(e.g. change in behaviour, application of knowledge)
28 14.6
Communication
(e.g. improved communication with patients, improved communication between practice staff or between staff and doctors)
26 13.6
Administration
(e.g. clarification of staff duties, member of staff designated to a particular role)
26 13.6
Medication
(e.g. change to prescribing software, medication change highlighted on discharge script from hospital)
24 12.6
Results/Investigations/Tests
(e.g. stop doing in-house tests)
18 9.4
Patient Records
(e.g. improved recording in notes - paper or electronic, important patient information highlighted in notes - electronic or paper)
16 8.4
Equipment and Workspace
(e.g. improved storage of equipment, face mask added to medical bag)
15 7.8
Appointments
(e.g. increase appointment time for emergency surgery)
31 . 6
Miscellaneous
(e.g. equipment & stocking within consulting room)
21 . 0
Staffing/Premises Issue
(e.g. book used to document leave, revision of supervisory arrangements)
21 . 0
￿ 154 SEA reports detailed actions to implement change
￿ More than one change may have been reported in a single report.BMC Family Practice 2009, 10:61 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/10/61
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quality, which does not exist in other similar studies.
However, this limits the generalisation of the findings
since no comparison was made between the types of
events and the subsequent learning issues and change
implemented between those reports deemed 'satisfactory'
and 'unsatisfactory'. There could also be selection bias as
SEA judged 'unsatisfactory' may describe important qual-
ity and safety issues but be difficult for GPs to describe
within the report format. SEA reports are written retro-
spectively normally by a single author who in most cases
acts as a proxy for the practice. Personal recollections may
therefore be affected by recall bias or misinterpretation of
reasons for event occurrence or decisions made. The study
may have been strengthened by undertaking a more in-
depth textual analysis of a sample of SEA reports. This
could have enabled the authors to identify (and subse-
quently amend) elements of the reporting format that
inhibits analysis of particular events and limits reflective
team based learning.
Context and Implications
Types of Events
SEA was originally proposed as an adjunct to the tradi-
tional quantitative approach to audit that allowed GP
practices to investigate specific areas of care not accessible
by this method [24]. The range of significant events iden-
tified for analysis in this study confirms the potential for
SEA to examine a breadth of patient-safety related subject
matter which appears largely unlikely to be captured by
criterion or cohort based audit. Although there is much to
be learned from 'good practice' it is apparent that GP
teams choose in the vast majority of cases to examine
events that could highlight sub-optimal care presumably
because they find these events are a more valuable learn-
ing experience [31]. The most common clinical areas for
analysis were cancers and acute psychiatric events and this
most probably reflects their role as 'marker' events identi-
fied by the General Medical Services contract (GMS) in the
UK as being worthy of SEA [29]. The benefits of using
these 'marker' events is that they can provide opportuni-
ties for prevention, early detection and inform on the
process of care [35]. They may also highlight previously
unknown learning needs. However there may be an
opportunity-cost to analysing these 'prescriptive' events
over self-selected events of potentially greater importance.
The frequent choice of events that relate to disease diagno-
sis and management and those that involve prescribing
and drug issues are consistent with GPs selecting topics
that reflect the routine case work of general practice both
in the UK and in other similar international healthcare
systems [12]. It also reflects the subject choice of SEA in
other parts of the UK [34].
Reasons for occurrence
This study found that the two most common reasons cited
for the significant event having taken place were self-
reported individual errors by the doctor and communica-
tion issues. The role of individual error may reflect appro-
priate insight on the part of the doctor. It is more likely,
however, that it could indicate a lack of understanding of
the deeper systems-based factors which contribute to
these errors or violations since it is known that flawed
health care systems rather than just the specific actions of
individuals are often the underlying causes of patient
Table 6: Level of patient harm as determined by NPSA grading system [27]
NPSA Severity Grading GP Principals
(n)
GP Registrars
(n)
Total
n (%)
No Harm - Impact Prevented
Any patient safety incident that had the potential to cause harm but was prevented, resulting in no harm to 
people receiving NHS-funded care
24 28 52 (27.2)
No Harm - Impact Not Prevented
Any patient safety incident that ran to completion but no harm occurred to people receiving NHS-funded 
care
33 24 57 (29.8)
Harm - Low
Any patient safety incident that required extra observation or minor treatment and caused minimal harm, to 
one or more persons receiving NHS-funded care
7 7 14 (7.3)
Harm - Moderate
Any patient safety incident that resulted in a moderate increase in treatment and which caused significant 
but not permanent harm, to one or more persons receiving NHS-funded care
9 13 22 (11.5)
Harm - Severe
Any patient safety incident that appears to have resulted in permanent harm to one or more persons 
receiving NHS-funded care
6 3 9 (4.7)
Harm - Death
Any patient safety incident that directly resulted in the death of one or more persons receiving NHS-funded 
care
2 1 3 (1.6)
Not applicable
Non-patient safety incidents
18 16 34 (17.8)
TOTAL 99 92 191BMC Family Practice 2009, 10:61 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/10/61
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safety incidents [36]. Such lack of understanding could be
addressed through local initiatives such as existing com-
munity health partnerships (CHPs) which provide educa-
tional sessions for all relevant primary healthcare staff or
individual learning through continuing professional
development.
Given that these SEA reports are submitted as part of an
educational exercise for the GP, it may be that the doctors
feel they will learn more by analysing significant events
attributable to themselves than events more directly
attributable to others or team members. Additionally GPs
are known to submit events that they feel responsible for
as a form of 'personal catharsis '[31].
Patient behaviour was thought to be an underlying factor
in over a quarter of significant events, which has rarely
been cited as a key reason for significant event occurrence
in general practice [37]. It does not necessarily mean that
there is 'blame' attached to the patients' role. Significant
events can be influenced by a host of factors including ill-
ness behaviour or lack of knowledge on the part of the
patient or their carers' or poor lines of communication
between the practice and the patient. Buetow and Elwyn
suggest that events, which may in part be attributable to
patients, need to be understood in the context of their
individual and social circumstances [38]. For instance, a
patient may contribute to a significant event because an
agreed action at a consultation cannot then be carried
through by the patient - such as taking time off employ-
ment to attend out patient clinics. Patients may also make
an informed choice that leads to a significant event, and
in such circumstances may be 'morally' responsible for
errors that they make [39]. However, the GP or the prac-
tice may contribute if they do not agree preferred manage-
ment options with the patient. In such circumstances,
patients may feel that they lack 'enablement' or 'partner-
ship' in the decision making process within the consulta-
tion. This can highlight training issues for the GP in their
consultation techniques.
External Involvement in SEA
A study in one Primary Care Trust in England found that
nearly 19% of significant events originated beyond the
Table 7: Involvement of healthcare professionals in the learning and implementation of change from undertaking a SEA.
Learning 
Needs 
Identified
(182/191 = 
95.3%)
Reporting 
GP
Partners Practice 
Manager
Practice 
Nurse
Administrati
on. Staff
Health 
Visitor
District 
Nurse
Comm. 
Pharmacist
Hospital
Patient Harm 
(n = 44)
44 (100%) 13
(29.6%)
2
(4.6%)
2
(4.6%)
4
(9.1%)
0
(0%)
0
(0%)
1
(2.3%)
0
(0%)
Non-Patient 
Harm 
(n = 138)
138
(100%)
57
(41.3%)
35
(25.4%)
29
(21.0%)
29
(21.0%)
2
(1.4%)
0
(0%)
6
(4.3%)
1
(0.7%)
Difference (95% 
Confidence 
Intervals) P-value
NA 11.8 (4-27)
P = 0.14
21 (11-30)
P < 0.01
16 (7-26)
P < 0.01
12 (1-23)
P = 0.03
NA NA NA NA
Action 
Taken
(154/191 = 
80.6%)
Reporting 
GP
Partners Practice 
Nurse
Admin. Staff Health 
Visitor
District 
Nurse
Comm. 
Pharmacist
Hospital
Patient Harm 
(n = 34)
34
(100%)
28
(82.4%)
7
(20.6%)
3
(8.8%)
2
(5.9%)
0
(0%)
0
(0%)
0
(0%)
1
(2.9%)
Non-Patient 
Harm 
(n = 120)
117
(97.5%)
87
(72.5%)
47
(39.2%)
33
(27.5%)
47
(39.2%)
2
(1.7%)
4
(3.3%)
0
(0%)
2
(1.7%)
Difference (95% 
Confidence 
Intervals) P-value
NA 10 (5-25)
P = 0.20
18(2-35)
P = 0.02
19(6-31)
P = 0.003
33(21-45)
P < 0.01
NA NA NA NA
￿ Because of small numbers no direct comparison was made between heath visitors, district nurses, community pharmacists and hospitals.BMC Family Practice 2009, 10:61 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/10/61
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general practice unit [34]. Although our study did not
look at place of origin, the finding that over half of events
involved an agency external to the practice highlights the
potential for multi-disciplinary and multi-agency learning
and collaboration in event analyses. This finding may also
demonstrate that many GP teams are prepared to investi-
gate what could be interpreted as difficult-to-resolve
"interface" issues. Alternatively there could be a degree of
'blame-shifting' attached to the event analyses.
Learning and change
The role of SEA as a reflective learning technique has been
highlighted [24,25]. The findings provide further evi-
dence of this but it is of note that much of the learning
would appear to be personal to the SEA report author.
There may be a reluctance to share this with colleagues if
the GP was professionally embarrassed or felt that the
learning point was not of sufficient interest to others. It is
also possible that there are difficulties with team dynam-
ics or interpersonal relationships within the GP team. This
would limit the potential of SEA but could be addressed
through training in team based learning for all relevant
members of the primary care unit. Another interpretation
is that the authors failed to document that they shared
their learning with other members of the practice team.
Although reflection and learning is recognised as an
important part of improving the quality of healthcare [40]
it is the application of this learning into sustained change
that will enhance the quality of each individual's care. It is
unclear if the learning and change described in these SEA
reports led to sustained improvement in health care prac-
tices. Of additional concern is the substantial minority of
reports not included in the study as they were considered
unsatisfactory by trained peers. The opportunities for pro-
fessional learning from events that may involve doctors'
mistakes or other healthcare errors may be lost due to a
failure to fully understand and apply the SEA technique
[31,41]. This may imply that SEA training - which is
mainly (though not exclusively) undertaken as part of
postgraduate medical education - needs to be encouraged
through both teaching of GP registrars and through GP
appraisal [28]. The evidence that SEA can improve the
quality of care, and enhance patient safety in particular, is
limited [25]. However, perhaps it should be seen in the
context of a raft of other quality improvement approaches
- such as audit, prescribing reviews, referral analysis, com-
plaints review and the nGMS contract itself - that are avail-
able to GPs and their teams as part of a multi-method
approach to reducing harm and minimising risk.
Patient safety
The small percentage of SEA reports that involved severe
harm or death is consistent with other recent UK data on
the severity of events analysed by GPs [31]. The NPSA rec-
ommends that a full Root Cause Analysis (RCA) should
be conducted in these cases rather than SEA [27]. RCA is a
more intensive and structured investigation process which
is normally led by a group of trained health care profes-
sionals who are independent and external to the event
[42]. However, a raft of barriers potentially militates
against the use of RCA in general practice: the independ-
ent contractor status of GPs may mean they are not
obliged to co-operate with external RCA investigators; the
time and cost implications of training GP team members
in RCA would be a major obstacle, while the use of face-
to-face interviews as a data collection method when
applying the technique could be potentially divisive in
small, close-knit teams. Although it is clear that severe
events occur in general practice, there does not appear to
be evidence that RCA is routinely applied. Policymakers
may need to reconsider the use of RCA in these situations.
In addition, SEA is only one method to identify and inves-
tigate patient safety issues. Criterion audit, the use of trig-
ger tools, patient surveys and interviews, case note review,
and 'sentinel event' monitoring all have a role in identify-
ing adverse events and errors [35,43,44]. These methods
should be considered complementary and healthcare
teams need to be able to apply these techniques inde-
pendently since there is often no overlap in their identifi-
cation of different patient safety issues [44]. There may be
practical issues for teams in allocating time and resources
to both apply and integrate these methods. However, it is
important that the interface between SEA and other
patient safety and healthcare quality improvement tech-
niques is established. This will help ensure that SEA is
undertaken appropriately.
With one in four events involving some form of harm,
(nearly all of which involve external agencies) it is also
apparent that GPs are prepared to confront potentially dif-
ficult issues that may not reflect well on them or their
practices. It is acknowledged that professional 'shame' can
inhibit the reporting of relevant safety issues [45]. How-
ever, efforts to minimise the emotional consequences of
such feelings can be achieved through recognition of the
underlying contributing factors to these incidents [46].
Sharing such events to improve the quality of care rather
than punish individuals can act as a driver to quality
improvement [47]. The majority of events had the poten-
tial to cause patient harm but did not actually do so. GPs
have been encouraged to identify and use these types of
'near misses' to highlight learning and safety issues in
practice rather than wait till a patient inevitably suffers
harm.[29,35] Given the range of outcomes outlined in the
reports, if properly applied, the SEA technique would
appear to be well placed to inform and educate on a wide
range of patient safety-related issues in general practice.
Although SEA is encouraged as a team-based activity
[24,25] if the event in question involved patient harm
then non-medical staff were less likely to be involved inBMC Family Practice 2009, 10:61 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/10/61
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the learning and change as a result of the analysis. As most
GPs will involve staff only where they deem it appropriate
[48] this is likely to represent a pragmatic decision on the
part of GPs to form a smaller, more relevant group when
clinical care issues are involved. Alternatively there may be
a reluctance to open up discussion to the wider primary
care team if the doctor perceives patient harm to have
been in some way related to their own professional prac-
tice.
Significant events are often described as a rich resource
that could aid both local and national reporting and
learning systems[27]. Indeed most of the patient safety
incidents amongst the SEA reports in this study could be
relatively easily applied to the NPSA reporting template
and other international taxonomies [13,49]. The narrative
aspect of SEA should serve to add depth to basic factual
details applied to reporting systems in health care and
thus could potentially offer much more information than
most incident reporting forms [43,47]. In addition, the
patient harm described in this study may be an under-rep-
resentation of the true volume of patient harm identified
by SEA since GPs are selective in the type of significant
events that they choose to submit to this peer review
model and those GPs who do submit their SEA for feed-
back may not be representative of their GP colleagues.
Given the large scale non-engagement of GPs in incident
reporting systems [30] it may be appropriate to encourage
the notification and sharing of these reports to inform the
patient safety agenda at the local and national level.
Conclusion
The study adds to the limited evidence of the potential of
SEA to improve healthcare quality and safety. It is applied
to investigate and learn from a wide variety of quality-
related issues identified by GP teams, including those
resulting in patient harm and which often involve other
health care agencies. Learning and change reportedly
occur but more research is required to establish if sustain-
able improvement is possible. Innovative methods of dis-
seminating learning and change to the wider primary care
environment are also required, while exploration of the
linkage between SEA and improving the engagement of
GP teams in local or national patient safety reporting sys-
tems should also be elucidated.
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